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ABSTRACT Low-rate distributed denial of service (LDDoS) attacks pose more challenging threats that
disrupt network security devices and services. Such type of attacks is difficult to detect and mitigate.
In LDDoS attacks, attacker uses low-volume of malicious traffic that looks alike legitimate traffic. Thus, it
can enter the network in silence without any notice. However, it may have severe effect on disrupting network
services, depleting system resources, and degrading network speed to a point considering them as one of the
most damaging attack types. There are many types of LDDoS such as application server and ICMP error
messages based LDDoS. This paper is solely concerned with the ICMP error messages based LDDoS. The
paper proposes a mechanism to mitigate low-rate ICMP error message attacks targeting security devices,
such as firewalls. The mechanism is based on triggering a rejection rule to defend against corresponding
detected attack as early as possible, in order to preserve firewall resources. The rejection rule has certain
adaptive activity time, during which the rule continues to reject related low-rate attack packets. This activity
time is dynamically predicted for the next rule activation period according to current and previous attack
severity and statistical parameters. However, the rule activity time needs to be stabilized in a manner in order
to prevent any additional overhead to the system as well as to prevent incremental loss of corresponding
legitimate packets. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can efficiently defend
against incremental evasion cycle of low-rate attacks, and monitor rejection rule activity duration to minimize
legitimate traffic loss.
INDEX TERMS Low-rate attacks, BlackNurse attack, Stateful firewall, session table, attack probabilistic
modeling.

I. INTRODUCTION

Interconnected computer systems and networks still suffer
from security threats especially Denial of Service (DoS) and
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. DoS attack is
considered as one-to-one-attack that uses only one compromised host to influence the network bandwidth and degrade
the provided services. However, DDoS attack uses multiple
compromised hosts (botnet) that were previously infected
with malwares to make them under malicious control. The
common goal is to overload the targeted victim with a
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Muhammad Khandaker
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tremendous amount of bogus traffic until it becomes slow
or unresponsive to legitimate requests. While servers such as
Web servers are the common targeted victims of DoS attacks,
firewalls and other security devices become a desirable target
of sophisticated types of these attacks recently [1], [2].
Firewalls are considered as the first line of defense in
network security. Based on the way they make their decisions,
firewalls are of two main types: stateless and stateful. Stateless packet filtering firewalls base their protection decision
on a single packet. They filter incoming and outgoing packet
traffic on hosts and networks according to a predefined set of
filtering rules. Each rule has an action associated with it either
to accept or drop a packet, depending on the packet’s header
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information (Protocol (Prot), IP source (Src-IP), source Port
(Src-P), IP destination (Dst-IP), destination Port (Dst-P), TCP
flags (SYN, ACK, FIN, RST, PSH), ICMP messages, etc.).
On the other hand, stateful inspection firewall make their
decision on a connection or session basis. Session table,
which keeps record of states of connections, is considered as
the heart of stateful firewall and it is usually used to improve
its performance. It safely considers that packets belonging
to a particular flow do not need to be re-checked against
the filtering rules. However, session table may become a
firewall bottleneck part and can be used against the firewall.
Attackers may craft special type of packets to flood this
limited resource. As a result, the session table is filled with
illegitimate flows that prevent legitimate flows from being
established.
While firewalls are designed to protect networks behind
them, they can suffer themselves from DDoS attacks intending particularly to overwhelm them and bringing them to
knees [1], [3]. Such types of DDoS attacks are known as
Denial of Firewalling (DoF) attacks. DoF attacks may target
the firewall filtering rules or the session table. The effect can
appear as increase in packet filtering time, CPU utilization,
memory usage and the number of allocated sessions in the
session table. This may make the firewall unresponsive and
lead to denial of service for all devices located behind the
firewall. Since the firewall has finite amount of memory
and CPU power the problem may get worse, as these finite
firewall resources define an upper bound on the number of
accepted traffic flows and the number of established sessions.
In DoF attacks two aspects are important to classify the
type of attacks launched against a firewall: the targeted firewall’s part and the used attack traffic volume, as shown
in Fig. 1. Depending on the intended firewall part, attackers
may target the firewall rule base or the session table. In DoF
attacks targeting the rule base, malicious packets are sent to
match the longest filtering path until either denied by the
default rule or accepted by firewall bottom rules with high
rules indices. This long path of packet matching process
increases firewall filtering time and degrade its performance
considerably. Likewise, DoF attacks targeting firewall’s session table intend to make the session table full by sending

FIGURE 1. DoF attacks targeting firewall’s rule base or the session table.
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massive fake requests that add redundant session entries,
preventing the process of legitimate connection requests.
The other criteria used for the classification of DoF attacks
is the attack traffic volume. Attackers may use high or lowrate attack traffic to overwhelm the target firewall. In highrate attacks, attackers use massive volume of attack traffic to
overwhelm the available bandwidth and to flood a firewall
with redundant packets, forcing it to perform purposeless
extra work. This extra work usually degrades the firewall
performance and holds up legitimate users’ traffic. Contrary,
a low-rate of special crafted malicious packets may have
more prolong effect on firewalls causing additional harm
and forcing them to work harder [4]. According to Corero
research [5], [6], vast majority of DDoS attacks are relatively
low-rate with 98% of these attacks were less than 10Gbps,
and the average attack duration is short, with 81% lasting
less than 10 minutes. Usually, a Low-rate attack is launched
periodically with high narrow spike and low frequency. The
main problem with such kind of attack traffic is that it is close
to the behavior of normal traffic making it difficult to detect
and mitigate. An example of such low-rate DoF attack is the
emerging BlackNurse attack. The attack is considered as one
of the LDDoS ICMP error message attacks. It launches a lowrate of special crafted ICMP packets (Destination unreachable Type: 3, Port unreachable Code: 3) that can overwhelm
targeted firewalls’ processors. When the firewall is under this
attack, its CPU utilization increases sharply until the firewall
becomes unresponsive. As a result, users from the LAN side
can no longer access the Internet [7], [8].
This paper proposes a mechanism to defend against lowrate DoF attacks that use ICMP error messages. The mechanism generalizes the idea proposed in [9] and offers efficient
and effective solution to its limitations. In [9], an approach
is proposed to defend particularly against the BlackNurse
attack. The approach uses an early rejection rule that is
triggered when a certain threshold is reached. The rule has a
time activity duration that is calculated according to previous
attack severity and statistical parameters of attack’s traffic.
However, under certain circumstance, attacker may evade this
approach by sending an incremental cycle of the BlackNurse
attack rate. The goal of the attacker is to continuously increase
the rule activity duration time, and this consequently will
increase corresponding legitimate ICMP packet loss. As a
result, in the worst case the rule will be activated all the time
rejecting all incoming ICMP packets of Type: 3, Code: 3
including legitimate packets. Thus there is a natural trade-off
between the firewall rule’s activation period and the legitimate packets loss.
In order to address the aforementioned trade-off problem,
this paper proposes a mechanism that can be used to mitigate low-rate ICMP error messages attacks. The mechanism
ensures that the rule corresponding to the detected low-rate
attack is activated as early as possible to preserve firewall
resources. During rule activation time, the firewall rejects all
packets related to the specified low-rate attack, provided that
rule activity duration is dynamically adjusted depending on
VOLUME 8, 2020

K. Hayawi et al.: Thwarting ICMP Low-Rate Attacks Against Firewalls While Minimizing Legitimate Traffic Loss

current and previous attack intensity and statistical properties of attack’s traffic. Moreover, the rule activation time is
stabilized in a manner preventing continuous attackers’ trails
to evade the proposed mechanism. The paper also includes
detailed mathematical derivations of continuous time Markov
chain modeling for low- rate attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related work. Section III presents background on types
of LDDoS attacks, possible available mitigations and their
limitations which motivate the work in this paper. Section IV
discuses continuous time Markov chain modeling based on
Possion counting process of low-rate attacks. Section V proposes an ICMP timed early rejection rule to mitigate low-rate
ICMP error message attacks. Section VI illustrates possible
new attacks against timed early rejection rule that can cause
legitimate packet loss. Section VII proposes algorithms to
defend against incremental evasion cycle of low-rate ICMP
error message attacks. Section VIII includes performance
evaluation of the proposed mechanism. Finally, section IX
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK

LDDoS attacks are usually difficult to detect at the network
level as they occupy less bandwidth. These attacks are often
shorter in duration and can be launched through a single
computer as in the case of the BlackNurse attack [7], [8].
They look alike legitimate traffic and often do not get the
attention of IT security staff as they use low malicious traffic
volume. However, they can deplete system resources and
degrade network performance severely which make them the
most damaging attacks type [5], [6]. Some research works
are done on the detection of low-rate attacks; however, they
lack proposal for real time mitigation mechanisms for such
attacks. Wenke Lee in [10] states that ‘‘Existing defenses
against low-volume DDoS attacks lack precision and they
cannot create a response in a timely manner’’.
In [11], a technique is proposed to identify two LDDoS
attacks, the constant and the pulsing attack from legitimate
traffic based on their distribution difference of packet size.
In [12] a method is proposed based on optimal objective
entropy to detect LDDoS attacks. The idea generalizes the traditional entropy metric. However, the distance value between
normal traffic and attack traffic is quite small and therefore,
increasing the false-positive rate. Likewise, a generalized
entropy and information distance between legitimate and
attack traffic to detect LDDoS attacks is proposed in [13].
The proposed measurement outperforms the tradition entropy
in terms of false-positive rate and distance gap, however
distance gap is still small. These research work falls on
the area of anomaly detection of low-rate attacks. In the
area of signature detection of low-rate attacks, a distributed
detection mechanism is presented in [14]. The mechanism
is based on dynamic time-warping method to calculate the
cumulative distance of the time warping between sampled
and template flows which gives the degree of similarities
between the two flows. However, this calculation is based on
VOLUME 8, 2020

attack flow periodicity. Authors in [15] evaluated the combined impact of attack pattern and network environment.
They studied system sophisticated attacks and the model
of the minimum transmission rate of attack packets to tune
the attack effect. However, all these research works fall in
the low-rate detection area where no specified mitigations
technique were proposed.
The majority of research work that exists in the literature attempt to improve the overall firewall performance
by proposing techniques to eliminate or minimize DoF
attacks targeting firewall’s filtering rules. These can be classified into the following categories: Firewall’s Rule/rulefield reordering techniques [16]–[19], Early packet rejection
techniques [20]–[23], and Tree-based decision techniques
with dynamic behavior [24]–[27].
Contrary, common mitigation techniques related to DoF
attacks on firewall session table are based on attack rate
limiting, as in Juniper Networks Screening features [28].
However, if the activation limit is over the desired boundary,
then attack traffic may pass through and consumes firewall
resources. Another point to mention is that these rate limiting
features requires administration attention to enable them.
Once enabled, they will be activated all the time unless disabled back. This may dramatically increase CPU and session
table utilization, such as in TCP SYN flood mechanism [29].
In [30], a mechanism is proposed to defend against DoF
attacks targeting session table. The mechanism used the natural properties of the splay tree firewall, and a session table
architecture that is based on session attributes separation to
deal with costly timeout attribute. In [31], fast session table
manipulation algorithm is proposed to improve session timeout process. The algorithm covers multi-queue architectures
however; it defends hosts only against SYN flood attack.
The work in this paper builds on and significantly extends
the preliminary work presented in [9]. The most noticeable
extensions include a model to handle incremental evasion
cycle of low-rate attacks that can break the system proposed
in [8], causing severe increment in the rejection rule activity time. The continuous increment in rule activity duration
results in a direct increase in legitimate packet loss. The paper
also includes detailed mathematical derivations of continuous time Markov chain modeling of low-rate attacks upon
which we base our proposed solution. In addition, this paper
presents an easy to implement algorithms to mitigate low-rate
ICMP error message attacks.
III. LOW-RATE ATTACKS BACKGROUND

High-rate DDoS attacks are usually forceful, and flood the
target with an overwhelming quantity of malicious packets to deplete its resources. These flooding attacks use a
lot of bandwidth which requires that the attacker controls
multiple machines in order to direct the massive traffic
towards the victim network and the application layers. For
instance, the SYN flooding attack exploits the connection
limit of the target by sending massive SYN packets with
spoofed Src_IP that add entries in the target session table.
78031
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However, SYN-ACK packets are never received, forcing
these entries in the session table to remain until their timeout
is reached. Thus, preventing benign requests.
In contrast, low-rate or slow-rate attacks are difficult to
detect and handle, as their goal is to overwhelm the victim
slowly and quietly. Instead of sending requests as fast as
possible as in the case of high-rate attacks, they are sent as
slow as possible consuming less bandwidth. The attack traffic
is difficult to distinguish from normal traffic as well as hard
to mitigate. Launching the attack does not require a lot of
resources, thus a single computer would be enough with no
need for additional bots. The victim can be a server such as
HTTP server or a network security device such as a firewall.
A. LOW-RATE ATTACKS TARGETING SERVERS

Usually, low-rate attacks target the application layer of the
server rather than the communication layers, as the former
does not require huge resources, only few packets request
with appropriate content are enough to launch the attack.
These bogus requests force the server to allocate fictitious
connections, reducing its ability to accept new requests. As a
result, preventing legitimate user requests. This is accomplished by transmitting requests to the server very slowly, but
faster than the server timeout. Most of the low-rate attacks
target the server’s HTTP protocol. If an HTTP request is
not complete, or if the transfer rate is very low, the server
keeps its resources busy waiting for the rest of the data. If the
server keeps too many resources busy, this creates a denial
of service. Attackers can use HTTP header and HTTP post
requests to carry out the low-rate attacks [32], [33].

FIGURE 2. Slow header attack.

one single CRLF characters would indicate that the request
headers are incomplete forcing the server to wait for long time
and consuming its resources.
2) SLOW BODY OR SLOW POST ATTACK

This attack is similar to Slow header attack concept. The
attacker with the help of a tool called RUDY, ‘‘Are You
Dead Yet?’’ sends partial POST body messages to the target
server [35]. Normally, the HTTP post request header contains
the size of the body message to be sent next. However, the
attacker sends the body message very slowly, forcing the
server to keep the connection open as more data is expected
to be received. More similar connections are created until
server resources are consumed in order to block legitimate
user requests, as shown in Fig. 3.

1) SLOWLORIS OR SLOW HEADER ATTACK

The attacker launches this attack with the help of a tool called
Slowloris. By which, the attacker can send multiple partial
HTTP header requests to the targeted server [34]. For each
coming request, the server opens a thread which should be
closed once the connection is completed. Normally, the server
closes exceedingly long-time connections in order to free
threads for upcoming requests. However, the attacker keeps
sending partial header requests periodically to hold up the
connection and prevent it from timing out. As a result, the
server can not release any of the partially opened connections and keeps waiting for the requests’ termination. As all
available threads get in use, the server would not be able to
accomplish legitimate user requests, as shown in Fig 2.
To be specific, all HTTP requests end with special characters that are parsed by the target server indicating that
the request packet is received. For instance, in a complete
HTTP GET request, each line in the header ends with CRLF
(Carriage Return+Line Feed) character, whereas two CRLF
characters are used in the last header row line to denote a
blank line. The HTTP protocol uses the blank line to indicate
the completion of the request header. Attackers make use
of this information and send HTTP GET requests without
the blank line, by suppressing one of the CRLF character
from the header’s last row line. Thus, the presence of only
78032

FIGURE 3. Slow body attack.

Usually, when a user fills in a web form, the data are sent
to the HTTP server using HTTP POST request using one or
two packets, and the server closes the connection. However,
in Slow body attack the form data is split into many packets
each contains one byte of the data to be sent. These packets
are sent at random time intervals preventing the server from
closing the connection and keeping it waiting for the request
completion.
3) SLOW READ

The Slow header and Slow body attacks depend on sending
slow HTTP requests, however, Slow read attack depends on
reading HTTP responses slowly. In this attack, the attacker
initiates legitimate connection with the target server and
sends an appropriate HTTP request. However, the attacker
VOLUME 8, 2020
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reads the server replies very slowly. This would force the
server to slow down its responses, and therefore the connection is kept alive for a long time. Moreover, the attacker may
not read the server response for a long time, and then before
the connection times out, starts reading data slowly one byte
at a time. This is accomplished by sending a Zero window to
the server, consequently, the server assumes that the requester
is busy reading the sent data. As a result, the connection
remains opened. Similar multiple connections would exhaust
the server resources and lead to DoS situation at a very slow
speed, preventing new requests [36]. The attack is illustrated
in Fig. 4.

FIGURE 6. The fields of an ICMP packet.

and Router solicitation or advertisement. ICMP Query messages can help in identifying problems and diagnosing them.
For example, ICMP Echo request or reply is the first step
towards checking if the destination device is alive or not.
To check it, the source device sends an ICMP Echo message
to the destination (Type:8, Code:0). Upon receiving the Echo
request, the destination device replies with an ICMP Echo
reply message (Type: 0, Code: 0). Once the source node
receives the Echo Reply from the destination, it understands
that the remote device is alive.

FIGURE 4. Slow read attack.

B. LOW-RATE ATTACKS TARGETING FIREWALLS

Attackers may target security devices such as firewalls, using
a special crafted packet sent at low-rate that can consume
firewall resources until it becomes unresponsive to legitimate
request. The most known LDDoS attacks on firewall are
based on the generation of ICMP error messages.
ICMP is an auxiliary protocol, which provides diagnostic information when requested [39]. ICMP can be
divided into two broad categories: Error reporting and
Query/Control, Fig. 5.

FIGURE 5. ICMP packet’s types.

The header of an ICMP packet is made mainly from
four fields, namely Type, Code, Checksum and Option
fields, Fig.6.
ICMP Query messages are generated when requested. Usually, these messages are used to collect information about
specific hosts or networks, or for troubleshooting. There are
4 types of ICMP Query messages: Echo request or reply,
Timestamp request or reply, Address mask request or reply,
VOLUME 8, 2020

FIGURE 7. Types of ICMP error-reporting messages.

ICMP Error-reporting messages, on the hand, are generated during the processing of any Internet packet when
a host or network device encounters a problem. That is,
these messages are used to report issues or errors that took
place in the Internet. There are 5 types of ICMP Errorreporting messages shown in Fig. 7: Destination unreachable,
Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter problem, and
Redirection. For example, an ICMP error-reporting message
of Type 3 (Destination unreachable) is generated when the
destination of the packet cannot be reached. The Code field in
the ICMP header provides further details about the message’s
type (e.g., Code = 0 for network unreachable, Code = 1
for host unreachable, Code = 2 for protocol unreachable,
Code = 3 for port unreachable). Another example is the
ICMP error-reporting message of Type 4 (Source Quench),
which is a message from one host to another asking the other
host to slow down the speed at which the packets are being
sent. Source Quench is one of the ways to control the packet
flow on the Internet.
The Option field of an ICMP error message usually
includes information about the packet that caused the error.
That is, the Option field includes part of the received IP
packet, which is represented by the IP header, plus the first
8 bytes of the message data, as shown in Fig. 8.
78033
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FIGURE 8. The option field of an ICMP error-reporting message.

Firewalls may require huge processing time to process
ICMP Error-reporting messages. That is, once an ICMP
Error-reporting packet reaches a firewall, the data in the
Option field is extracted and the firewall’s session table
is searched for any session related to the received ICMP
packet. Usually, this process may take enormous processing
time and affect the overall firewall’s performance. Hence,
malicious users may succeed to create a DoF attack situation within the firewall by sending ICMP Error-reporting
packets to the firewall targeting its session table. In contrast
to common DoS attacks that are based on high-rate traffic
generation, a low-rate of ICMP Error-reporting traffic have
been found to be able to degrade the performance of firewalls
significantly [4]–[9]. Such attacks are known under the name
of low-rate DoF attacks. The BlackNurse attack is a wellknown example of such attacks, and is specifically based on
generating ICMP error message of type 3.
1) BLACKNURSE ATTACK

This attack depends on sending low-rate ICMP error message
[Type:3 (Host unreachable), Code:3 (Port unreachable)] to
the targeted firewall [7]–[9]. These error messages are considered among the most expensive computationally, because
they consume much of the processing power of the stateful
firewall. The attack can drive high firewall CPU loads and
make the firewall unresponsive, as shown in Fig. 9. As a
result, users from the LAN side will no longer be able to
exchange network traffic.

FIGURE 9. The BlackNurse attack.

Usually, ICMP port unreachable message [Type:3, Code:3]
is sent when a destination host cannot deliver a reply packet
because the intended port is not active. For instance, if a
78034

source computer sends a UDP port 53 request to a target
computer that is not a DNS server, the target will generate ICMP port unreachable message to the source. Attacker
makes use of such packets to launch the BlackNurse attack.
The reason behind the increase in firewall CPU loads is due
to the tracking process of ICMP error messages used in stateful firewalls. After receiving a UDP port 53 request shown
in Fig. 9, the firewall inspects the source and destination
addresses and UDP port numbers. If there is a filtering rule
that allows the packet to across, the firewall inserts a new
UDP entry in the session table. If there is no DNS service
running on the target computer, the target will generate ICMP
port unreachable message. Once the firewall receives the
ICMP port unreachable message, it extracts from the packet’s
payload the attribute of the original packet (UDP request)
that caused this error message to be sent. Then, the firewall
searches its session table for a related session entry with
similar attributes. If a match is found, the error message
is embedded to its related session entry and is allowed to
pass through the firewall in order to notify the sender that
the request sent is not accomplished. This costly process of
stateful analysis of ICMP error messages would consume
the firewall resources and prevent it from processing normal
traffic when more superfluous requests are sent.
C. LIMITATIONS OF COMMON AVAILABLE LOW-RATE
ATTACK MITIGATIONS

Mitigations of low-rate attacks targeting servers are made
with special configurations that can track server resources
allocation such as memory and CPU usage, connection
tables and application threads to identify any abuse of these
resources. Also, monitoring long and idle open connections,
and stuck application processes would help. Indeed, configuring server connection timeout would prevent low-rate attacks.
For example, a connection timeout in an Apache server can
be configured as follows:
<IfModule mod_reqtimeout.c> RequestReadTimeout
header=20, MinRate=500 body=20, MinRate=500
</IfModule>
This configuration will timeout any connection if the
sender fails to send the header or the body data within
20 seconds each. However, as the rate of attack’s traffic is
reduced, the quality of service would also be degraded. This
is because short timeout would wrongly disconnect legitimate
connections.
Likewise, common DoF attacks are mitigated using
threshold-based mechanisms, such as Screen features used
in Juniper Networks [28]. Usually, these mechanisms require
balanced threshold configurations, as high threshold activation values may allow attack traffic to pass through the firewall as well as low threshold values may introduce legitimate
packet loss. In addition, expert knowledge is required as most
of these threshold-based mechanisms are often not enabled,
and even if enabled, they would dramatically increase CPU
and session table utilization, such as in TCP SYN flood mechanism [29]. Furthermore, the values entered for threshold
VOLUME 8, 2020
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mechanisms remain indefinitely the same until updated by
the administrator.
For instant, the BlackNurse attack can be mitigated by
denying ICMP packets arriving at the WAN interface of the
firewall. However, this would prevent inside hosts from using
ping command as reply will never get back. Even if ICMP
[Type: 3] messages sent to the firewall WAN interface are
only denied, as recommended in [7], the ICMP Path MTU
discovery will be disabled because ICMP [Type: 3, Code: 4]
packets will also be denied. Contrary, thinking of using a
filtering rule to block ICMP [Type: 3, Code: 3] packets is
also not a valid choice, as this can affect a DNS resolver when
attempting to connect to a non-existing DNS server because
it never receives the ICMP port unreachable message. The
following Snort rule is proposed in [7] as a solution to defend
against the BlackNurse attack:
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
any (msg:‘‘TDC-SOC - Possible BlackNurse attack from
external source’’; itype:3; icode:3; count 250, seconds 1; reference:url, soc.tdc.dk/blacknurse/blacknurse.pdf;
metadata:TDC-SOC-CERT,18032016; priority:3;
sid:88000012; rev:1;
However, this Snort rule is also a threshold-based solution
and is applied all the time, where fake and legitimate port
unreachable messages are dropped if a limit of 250 packets
per second is reached.
Iptables rate limit ICMP port unreachable messages by
default. This explains the reason that iptable-based products
are unaffected by the BlackNurse attack [7]. The Linux 2.4.20
kernel limits destination unreachable messages to one per
second in net/ipv4/icmp.c. However, this method would even
prevent other benign ICMP destination unreachable messages
from reaching their proper destinations, if their rates are more
than the desired limit. This means that the iptable treats fake
and legitimate destination unreachable messages in the same
manner.
All aforementioned limitations pose a crucial need for
scalable mechanism that update threshold values dynamically
according to traffic behavior, attack intensity and system’s
needs in order to address the trade-off problem between the
rule’s activation period and legitimate packets loss. First, we
adopt stochastic process based on continuous-time Markov
Chains to model low-rate attack traffic behavior. Accordingly, Poisson counting process can be used in the proposed
mechanism for identifying the transition probabilities of lowrate attack incidents.
IV. CONTINUOUS-TIME MARKOV CHAINS MODELING OF
LOW-RATE DoS ATTACKS

Let the total number of low-rate DoS attacks incidents N (t)
by the observation time t be the state of the continuous-time
Markov chain process N (t); t ≥ 0 at time t. As such, this
process is characterized by the Markovian property that the
conditional probability distribution of future state N (t + r) of
total number of attacks at time t + r given the present state
N (r) at time r and all past states N (h) at times 0 ≤ h < s
VOLUME 8, 2020

is independent of the past. In other words, the future state of
the total number of attacks depends only on its present state.
That is,
P{N (t + r) = k|N (r) = I , N (h) = n(h)}
= P{N (t + r) = k|N (r) = I }

(1)

This way, we can define a continuous-time Markov chain
based on Poisson counting process that have the following
states: (0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , k, k + 1, ..) assuming that the attack
incidents are independent and happen at random time with a
rate of λ. This can be achieved by dividing the observation
time t into infinitesimally small values of times at which the
probability of the attack (P) tends to be zero, i.e. limP→0 ,
while the number of attacks incidents during observation
time t tends to be ∞, i.e. limN →∞ . Thus, the attacks occur at
a constant rate of λ = N × P.
This process is an example of a pure birth process since the
transition occurs only in the forward direction from k to k +1,
where k ≥ 0 [37]. Moreover, the times between each pair of
attack incidents are independent and identically distributed
exponential random variable with parameter λ [38]. The transition graph of this process is shown in Fig. 10 in which each
state k is connected to itself and the next state k + 1 as only
one attack incident can occur at any instant of time.

FIGURE 10. The transition graph of continuous-time Markov chain of
studied attacks.

Using Champan-Kolmogorov relationship, we have the
following differential equation that governs the behavior of
its transition probabilities matrix P(t) in terms of the jump
rate matrix Q,
dP(t)
= P(t)Q
(2)
dt
where the jump rate matrix Q for such a stochastic process is
defined as follows by picking an infinitesimally small value
of t to represent an instant of time.


−λ λ
0 0 ···
 0 − λ λ 0 · · ·


 0
P(δt) − I
0 − λ λ · · ·

 (3)
Q = lim
=
·
· · · · ·
δt→0
δt
 ·

 ·
·
· · · · ·
·
·
· · ···
Since it is a pure birth process, all elements below the
diagonal are zeros. The rates for the transition from state k to
k+i where i > 1 are also zeros because the allowed increment
in the total number of attacks for a Poisson counting process
is 1. Furthermore, The Q matrix has a bi-diagonal structure
in which all the elements along the diagonal are equal to −λ,
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and all the elements on the upper diagonal are equal to λ. That
is the transition rate from state k, where k is the total number
of attacks, to itself is −λ, whilst it is λ for transition from state
k to state k + 1.
To find the transition probability P0k (t) of k low-rate DoS
attacks incidents by the observation time t, we write the
matrices representation of the above Champan-Kolmogorov
family of equations (Eq. 2) as follows.


dP00 (t)
dP01 (t)
dP02 (t)
dP03 (t)
·
·
·

 dt
dt
dt
dt



 dP10 (t)
dP11 (t)
dP12 (t)
dP13 (t)


·
·
·

 dt
dt
dt
dt



 dP (t)
dP21 (t)
dP22 (t)
dP23 (t)
 20
· · ·


dt
dt
dt

 dt
 ·
·
·
·
··· 


 ·
·
·
·
··· 
·
·
·
·
···


dP00 (t)
dP01 (t)
dP02 (t)
dP03 (t)
· · ·
 dt
dt
dt
dt


 dP10 (t)

dP11 (t)
dP12 (t)
dP13 (t)

· · ·
 dt

dt
dt
dt


 dP (t)

dP21 (t)
dP22 (t)
dP23 (t)
 20
· · ·


dt
dt
dt
 dt

 ·

·
·
·
·
·
·


 ·
·
·
·
··· 
·
·
·
·
···


−λ
λ
0
0 ···
 0
−λ
λ
0
· · ·


 0
0
−λ λ
· · ·


(4)
 ·
·
·
· ··· 


 ·
·
·
· ··· 
·
·
·
· ···
For example, to find P00 (t), we first calculate its corre00 (t)
sponding derivative dPdt
using matrix multiplication rules
as in the following,
dP00 (t)
= −λP00 (t)
(5)
dt
Then we take the integral of both sides,
Z P00 (t)
Z t
dP00 (t)
=
−λdt
(6)
P00 (t)
1
0
Finally, we simplify to get an expression for P00 (t) as
follows,
P00 (t) = e−λt

(7)

This shows that the probability of one or more low-rate
DoS attacks by the observation time t increases as the time
gets larger. Similarly, we calculate the rest of transition probabilities as follows,
P01 (t) = λte−λt
λ2 t 2 −λt
e
P02 (t) =
2
λ3 t 3 −λt
P03 (t) =
e
6
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(8)

Consequently, the general term for the transition probability of k low-rate DoS attacks incidents by the observation time
t given that it is a Poisson counting process is as follows,
P0k (t) =

(λt)k −λt
e
k!

(9)

V. ICMP EARLY REJECTION RULE WITH TIME-TO-DEFEND
TO MITIGATE LOW-RATE ICMP ATTACKS

We propose for each low-rate ICMP error message attack an
early rejection rule that is identified by related attack type
and code values. The rule is given a high priority precedency
in the firewall rule base in order to be evaluated as early as
possible to preserve the firewall resources during the attack.
The general early rejection rule format is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. General format of low-rate ICMP error message early rejection
rule.

The rule consists of two parts: Identifier part <ICMP (x,y)>
and Time-to-Defend part <TTD>. The identifier part includes
Protocol, IP addresses, Type, Code, and Action fields, where
(x,y) represent valid ICMP error message type and code
values, respectively. For instance, the BlackNurse attack identifier part would look like <ICMP (3,3)>, which corresponds
to: <Prot:1, Scr_IP:∗, Dst_IP:∗, Type:3, Code:3, Action:
Deny>. The time to defend part <TTD> represents the rule
activity time duration. This determines the rule life-time for
which the rule is enabled to mitigate the corresponding ICMP
error message attack. The <TTD> is calculated dynamically
depending on the attack statistics and severity parameters
using the derived Poisson distribution for continuous time
Markov chains, Eq. (9).
The <ICMP (x,y), TTD> rule is triggered once corresponding ICMP error messages reach a minimum certain rate limit,
Rtrigger . Beyond that minimum Rtrigger , the firewall resources
usage increases, and may become unresponsive to legitimate
requests. In the case of the BlackNurse attack, Rtrigger is
around 15-18 Mbit/s (40-50) k packets per second and is able
to overwhelm the affected firewall’s CPU regardless of the
Internet connection capacity [7]. However, in [8] a 7K packets
per second of the BlackNurse attack was enough to increase
the CPU utilization of Juniper NetScreen SSG 20 to 89%, as
shown in Fig. 11 and 12.
The process of triggering <ICMP (x,y), TTD> rule is illustrated in algorithm 1. The firewall extracts the ICMP error
message type and code values (x,y), then searches the session
table for a related session using the payload data. If a related
VOLUME 8, 2020

K. Hayawi et al.: Thwarting ICMP Low-Rate Attacks Against Firewalls While Minimizing Legitimate Traffic Loss

indicating an attack is undergoing, then the corresponding
<ICMP (x,y)> rule is triggered for <TTD> seconds.
For the rule activity time part <TTD>, recall that textitTTD is defined as the time needed for a countermeasure
c (e.g. access control policy) to gain some level of control on
some attack vector A (e.g. BlackNurse) [9].

FIGURE 11. The effect of the BlackNurse attack on Juniper SSG 20 CPU
performance.

FIGURE 12. Juniper NetScreen SSG 20 CPU status during the BlackNurse
attack.

Algorithm 1 rule_Trigger(P, Rtrigger , TTD(t))
Input: ICMP error message P, Rtrigger .
Output: True if <ICMP (x,y), TTD> rule is triggered,
False otherwise.
1 X ← P.type
2 y ← P.code
3 s ← findSession(P)
4 if s 6 = NULL then
// P is not fake
5
deleteSessions(s)
6
forward(P, P.getinitiatorSrc())
7
return false
8 else
9
r ←r +1
10
if r == Rtrigger then
11
tiggerICMP(x, y, TTD(t))
12
r← 0
13
return true
14
end if
15
return false // P is fake but r has not
reached Rtrigger .
16 end if

session is found, the firewall deletes the session to free its
resources, and forwards the error message to the initiator.
However, if no related session is found the counter r for this
type of error message is incremented, and if it reaches Rtrigger
VOLUME 8, 2020

Algorithm 2 calc_TTD(TTD(t), TTD(t − 1), Rmax (t),
Rmax (t − 1)))
Input: TTD(t) and TTD(t − 1), current and previous
maximum attack rate Rmax (t) and Rmax (t − 1).
Output: TTD(t + 1) to be used next time once <ICMP
(x,y)> is triggered.
1 Calculate α(t) using Eq.(10)
2 Calculate P(t) using Eq.(11)
3 Calculate β(t) using Eq.(12)
4 Calculate TTD(t + 1) using Eq.(13)
5 return TTD(t + 1)

We use t − 1, t, t + 1 to represent parameters in previous,
current and next observation windows of time, respectively.
Given the current TTD(t) value, the current and previous
attack statistics and severity parameters, algorithm 2 objective is to predict TTD(t + 1) that will be used next time, once
<ICMP (x,y)> rule is triggered. The current and previous
attack statistics and severity parameters are defined as follows
α(t) = (Rmax (t) − Rmax (t − 1))/Rmax (t − 1)
P(t) = 1 − e−λTTD(t)
β(t) = (P(t) − P(t − 1))/P(t − 1)

(10)
(11)
(12)

where:
Rmax (t): is the maximum rate of the ICMP(x, y) attacks
during current observation window t.
Rmax (t −1): is the maximum rate of the ICMP(x, y) attacks
during previous observation window t − 1.
P(t): is the Poisson distribution of the ICMP(x, y) attacks
during current observation window t, with mean λTTD(t).
P(t − 1): is the Poisson distribution of the ICMP(x, y)
attacks during previous observation window t − 1, with mean
λTTD(t − 1).
Rmax (t − 1) and P(t − 1) were sufficient to induce TTD(t).
Hence, we use the change in Rmax and P relative to their
original values to update TTD(t + 1) as follows:
TTD(t + 1) = (1 + α(t) + β(t))TTD(t)

(13)

where:
TTD(t): is the current rule activity time duration in seconds
during current observation window t, initialized to TTD(0) in
the beginning.
TTD(t + 1): is the predicted rule activity time duration in
seconds to be used in the next observation window t +1, once
<ICMP (x,y) > rule is triggered.
78037

K. Hayawi et al.: Thwarting ICMP Low-Rate Attacks Against Firewalls While Minimizing Legitimate Traffic Loss

VI. EVASION ATTACK AGAINST TIMED EARLY REJECTION
RULE

VII. PROPOSED MODIFIED MECHANISM TO MITIGATE
ICMP LOW-RATE ATTACKS

The previous work on the BlackNurse attack detection and
prevention [9] is vulnerable to a special type of attack, where
the attacker can try to progressivley increase the rule activity
duration time. Consequently, this will increase corresponding
legitimate ICMP packet loss. For instance, in the worst case,
the BlackNurse early rejection rule <ICMP (3,3), TTD> will
be activated all the time, rejecting all incoming ICMP packets
of Type: 3, Code: 3.
An attacker may manipulate the attack rate, so that TTD(t)
keeps increasing. This can be done by continuously increasing Rmax (t). Fig. 13 shows the resulting effect.

The main idea behind mitigation of the aforementioned attack
is to set a threshold on <TTD> so that it cannot increase indefinitely. We propose three techniques to adaptively choose the
threshold. Following subsections describe them in detail.

FIGURE 13. TTD(t ) can increase indefinitely if attacker keeps increasing
the attack rate, Rmax (t ).

Here, the goal of the attacker is to increase TTD(t), and thus
make the firewall deny legitimate packets for longer periods
of time. Fig. 14 shows the effect by plotting amount of loss in
legitimate packets due to the increase of TTD(t) manipulated
by the attacker.

FIGURE 14. Loss in legitimate packets increases when TTD increases.

As seen in Fig. 14, as the percentage of legitimate packets
increases, the total number of legitimate packets loss also
increases. For example, if 10% packets are legitimate, then
the number of legitimate packets lost for TTD = 2.5 is
about 4,200, but if 50% are legitimate, then the total loss is
21600 for the same TTD. From this analysis, we infer that
if the attacker keeps increasing the TTD, it will approach
infinity and ultimately cause the firewall to deny all legitimate
packets. Therefore, in this work, we propose a mechanism to
detect this kind of attack and avoid TTD to increase indefinitely. Next section details this approach.
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Algorithm 3 TTD_Adjust(TTD(t), TTDU , ζ (t))
Input: TTD(t), TTDU , ζ (t)
Output: Updated TTD(t + 1)
1 TTD(t + 1) ←
calc_TTD(TTD(t), TTD(t − 1), Rmax (t), Rmax (t − 1))
2 if TTD(t + 1) > TTDU then
3
Calculate ζ (t) using Eq.14
4
Update TTD(t + 1) using Eq.15 // Update the
start index needed for next
adjustment.
5
s←t +1
6 end if
7 return TTD(t + 1)

A. TTD ADJUSTMENT PROCESS

Algorithm 3 illustrates the process of TTD adjustment to
eliminate evasion attack impact using an upper threshold.
Let <TTD> has an upper threshold, TTDU . If the predicted
TTD(t + 1) in Eq. (13) is larger than TTDU , then it is
adjusted by an amount ζ , computed using the following
equation:
P
δ ti=s (TTD(i + 1) − TTD(0))2
ζ (t) =
(14)
t −s+1
where:
ζ (t): is the correction offset at time t.
δ: is an adjustable weight parameter.
t − s + 1: is the number of time-stamps passed since
the last TTD(t + 1) correction. In other words, the last
TTD(t + 1) correction was at time t − s.
TTD(0): is the reference TTD(t) value.
Eq. (14) computes the mean squared error, weighted by δ,
for the last TTD(t + 1) values from s until t, with respect to
the reference TTD(0). If the TTD(t + 1) value is higher than
TTDU , it is reduced by ζ (t) as follows:
TTD(t + 1) = TTD(t + 1) − ζ (t)

(15)

Algorithm 3, calls algorithm 2 which is responsible for
calculating TTD(t + 1). If the calculated TTD(t + 1) is
greater than TTDU , then ζ (t) is computed and TTD(t + 1)
is adjusted accordingly. By this, <TTD> can be protected
against attacker evasion attempt to increase it indefinitely, and
accordingly legitimate packet loss is preserved.
We combine the proposed early rule triggering process
and TTD adjustment algorithms to form an effective collaborative defense mechanism against low-rate ICMP error
VOLUME 8, 2020
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Algorithm 4 thwart_low_rate_ICMP( )
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9

t=r =s←0
while true do
P ←nextICMP_Error_Packet
trigger←rule_Trigger(P, Rtrigger , TTD(t))
if trigger==true then
TTD(t + 1) ← TTD_Adjust
(TTD(t), TTDU , ζ (t))
t ←t +1
end if
end while

Algorithm 5 PosIncr_Threshold(L)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

message threats. Algorithm 4 illustrates the overall concatenation for the previous proposed algorithms. The firewall continues filtering incoming packets, once ICMP error
message P is received, rule_Trigger algorithm is invoked
to keep trace of P until it is either forwarded to the initiator to inform for an error, or P is tracked to check
if more of such packets are received previously indicating a low-rate attack is undergoing. If the later was the
case, <ICMP (x,y), TTD> rule is triggered to preserve
firewall resources. Following that TTD_Adjust algorithm is
invoked to keep track of the corresponding rule activity time,
and dynamically complete required calculations to adjust
<TTD> in case of increment attack evasion. Finally, the
system behavior and time-to-defense are predicted dynamically to be used in case of similar attacks happen in the
future.
B. METHODOLOGY TO DETERMINE THE UPPER
THRESHOLD TTDU

Algorithm 3 calibrates the predicted TTD(t + 1), to be used in
the future in case of similar attacks, against an upper threshold
TTDU . If TTD(t + 1) > TTDU , then adjustment process
follows accordingly. In this section we propose methods for
determining TTDU .
1) BUSINESS MODEL THRESHOLD

The business model threshold is based on a predefined upper
bound on the number of legitimate packets lost. For example, if the business model restricts the number of legitimate
packet loss to maximum 1000, then according to Fig. 14,
TTD(t + 1) must be 1.613 or less. Therefore, we will choose
TTDU = 1.613 in algorithm 3, and apply the TTD adjustment
process accordingly.
2) POSITIVE INCREMENT THRESHOLD

The positive increment threshold is based on an upper limit
on the number of times TTD(t + 1) increases consecutively.
Let this limit be L. Then TTDU can be determined using
algorithm 5. If the number of consecutive increments of
TTD(t + 1) values is L, then we set the TTDU to the last
TTD(t + 1) value before the consecutive increments happen.
VOLUME 8, 2020

10

Input: L// Limit on the number of times
TTD(t + 1) increases consecutively.
Output: TTDU // The positive increment
threshold.
if t=0 then
temp ←0
ctr ←0// Initialize counter ctr.
end if
if TTD(t + 1) > TTD(t)) then
ctr = ctr + 1
if ctr == L then
TTDU = TTD(temp)
ctr=0
end if

11
12
13
14
15
16

else
ctr ← 0
temp ← t
end if
return TTDU

The variable ctr is used to keep track of the number of
consecutive increments.
3) ATTACK PROBABILITY THRESHOLD

This threshold is based on an upper limit on P(t), which is the
probability of attack during TTD(t) period. From Eq. (11), we
can infer that as TTD(t) tends to infinity, P(t) approaches 1,
and β approaches zero (Eq. 12). Therefore, an upper limit on
P(t) will also set an upper limit to TTD. Let the upper limit
on P(t) be PMAX . This follows that:
P(t) ≤ PMAX
or, 1 − e−λTTD(t) ≤ PMAX , using Eq. (11).
Thus, TTD(t) ≤ −ln(1 − PMAX )/λ.
Therefore, TTDU in algorithm 3 can be set to:
TTDU = −ln(1 − PMAX )/λ

(16)

VIII. PERFOMANCE EVALUATION

The proposed algorithms to defend against low-rate ICMP
error message attacks are implemented using Java programming language. Despite that during some time intervals where
low-rate attacks are not launched and therefore the triggering
process is not accomplished, <TTD> calculations and adjustments are kept from the last previous time interval during
which the corresponding low-rate attack had occurred. The
parameters λ and Rmax (t) are used in the proposed model to
define the attacker skill level. For each occurrence of a lowrate ICMP attack that trigger the corresponding <ICMP (x,y),
TTD> rule, TTD(t + 1) is calculated to be used in the next
time for similar attack type occurrence. For instance, we simulated the proposed mechanism for expert attacker skill level
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since this type of attacker has high experience and tries to
manipulate Rmax (t) in order to evade the system and increase
<TTD> indefinitely. Thus, in this section we evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed method in thwarting the lowrate ICMP error message attacks and analyze its performance
under different parameter settings. The triggering rate Rtrigger
is set as 7K packets per second. All experiments parameters
are plotted for 40 consecutive time sequences.
A. TTD ADJUSTMENT

In this section we show how TTD(t +1) are adjusted based on
three proposed threshold methods for TTD(t + 1) adjustment,
as proposed in Section VII(B).
1) ADJUSTMENT BY BUSINESS MODEL THRESHOLD

As explained before, the business model threshold is based
on a predefined upper bound on the number of legitimate
packets lost.
In this experiment, we show how effectively TTD(t + 1)
adjustment process works using this threshold. The results are
shown in Fig. 15 for different values of δ between 0.5 and 0.9,
and TTDU = 1.6(s), which was selected based on business
requirement as explained in Section VII(B)

FIGURE 16. Effect of TTD(t + 1) correction using positive increment
threshold (L) for different values of L between 5 to 20.

attack during TTD(t) period. We have conducted the experiment with different values of PMAX ranging from 0.995
to 0.9999995, and the results are shown in Fig. 17.

FIGURE 17. Effect of TTD(t + 1) correction using positive increment
threshold (L) for different values of L between 5 to 20.

FIGURE 15. Effect of TTD(t + 1) correction using algorithm 3. The graphs
show TTDU = 1.6(s), and updated value of TTD(t ) over time.

As shown in Fig. 15, from the time TTD(t + 1) reaches
the threshold TTDU, TTD(t) values fluctuate between the
threshold and a lower value, but never exceed the threshold.
Besides, the parameter controls how far the TTD(t + 1) value
can go down after it reaches the threshold using Eq.15. For
example, higher values of tend to dip TTD(t + 1) higher, and
vice-versa.
2) ADJUSTMENT BY POSITIVE INCREMENT THRESHOLD

Recall that positive increment threshold (L) puts an
upper bound on the number of consecutive increment of
TTD(t + 1). We experimented with different values of L, the
results of which are shown in Fig. 16.
We observe that for lower values of L, the threshold is
adjusted more frequently and vice-versa. Furthermore, for
higher values of L, the TTD(t + 1) value may also reach much
higher (e.g. 2.6 as shown in the figure).

It is evident from Fig. 17 that higher values of PMAX
result in not only higher values of TTDu but also less frequent
adjustment of TTD(t + 1).
Comparing the three different thresholds we can observe
that they exhibit a similar trend: higher values of threshold
result in less frequent adjustment of TTD(t + 1), which
in turn lead to more legitimate packet loss. However, less
frequent adjustment can also save processing time. Therefore,
this tradeoff should be considered in choosing the threshold
values. On the other hand, each threshold has its own merit
based on specific circumstances and priorities. For example,
if business requirement is very well defined then we can
choose specific value of the business threshold that meets the
business policy. On the contrary, if the attack probability is
very high, then we opt to choose the maximum probability
threshold PMAX . This is because higher attack probability
means the value of β(t) approaches zero and thus the frequency of attack does not affect the adjustment of TTD(t + 1)
value (refer to Eq. 13). Therefore, choosing PMAX as the
threshold, we try to avoid this scenario. Finally, if none of the
above scenarios apply, we can choose the positive increment
threshold (L).

3) ADJUSTMENT BY ATTACK PROBABILITY THRESHOLD

B. EFFECT OF PARAMETER λ

As mentioned in Section VII(B), this threshold (PMAX ) is
based on an upper limit on P(t), which is the probability of

Fig. 18 shows the effect of varying parameter λ between 1
and 10 on TTD(t). It can be seen that higher values of λ tend
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FIGURE 18. The Effect of λ on the TTD(t ) growth rate.

to increase TTD(t) more rapidly towards the threshold. This is
important desirable property of proposed adaptive Time-ToDefend (TTD(t)) because it models that fact that the defense
system reacts dynamically to the level of skills of attacker
modeled by values of λ. In this fashion, TTD(t) is adapted
such that the likelihood of successful low-rate ICMP error
message attacks and their impact on the firewall performance
tend to be decreased.
C. INFLUENCE OF λ ON PARAMETER β

In this experiment, we analyze the effect on β by changing parameter λ between 1 and 10. As seen in the previous experiment (Fig. 16), TTD(t) increases more rapidly
for a higher value of λ. As a result, P(t) also increases
(Eq.11), and approaches 1, as TTD(t) approaches infinity
(Section VII-B-3). Therefore, as Fig. 19 shows, β reaches 0
more quickly for higher values of λ (Eq.12). This is because
β measures the change in probabilities between two consecutive time points.
FIGURE 20. Loss in legitimate packets for TTD(t + 1) adjustment using
algorithm 3 when δ values vary between 0.5-0.9.

FIGURE 19. How β is affected by λ and TTD(t ).
FIGURE 21. Effect of TTD(t + 1) adjustment using algorithm 3 for different
δ values, and coresponding values of legitimate packet loss over time.

D. MINIMIZING LEGITIMATE PACKET LOSS

This experiment studies the effect of using the TTD(t + 1)
adjustment algorithm with TTDU = 1.6(s) in minimizing
legitimate packet loss for different values of between 0.5
and 0.9. As indicated in experiment A on TTD(t) adjustment, greater values of tends to have greater affect in TTD(t)
adjustment. Also, this would affect accordingly legitimate
packet loss as shown in Fig. 20. To be specific Table 2
compares accumulative legitimate packet loss without using
VOLUME 8, 2020

TTD(t) adjustment in prior work [9] with TTD(t) adjustment mechanism proposed in this paper for different ratios
of legitimate packets relative to low-rate DoS attack traffic (10%-50%). It is clearly shown that TTD(t) adjustment
tends to minimize legitimate packet loss by 25.3-26.4% when
δ values vary between 0.5 and 0.9, due to the correction
offset, ζ (t).
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TABLE 2. Accumulative legitimate packet loss when using TTD with and without adjustment algorithm.

Fig. 21 shows a specific example for minimizing legitimate
packet loss when 50% of traffic is legitimate for δ values vary
between 0.5-0.9.

of early rejection rule with time to defend duration to cover
other classes of low-rate DoF attacks. Iptables can be used as
open source firewall to implement the proposed mechanism.

IX. CONCLUSION
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